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On May 20, 1974 the Timorese Social 
Democratic Association (ASDT) was founded 
in East Timor. Four months later, the ASDT 
changed its name to  FRETILIN  - the 
Revolutionary Front of Independent East 
Timor. May 20, 1975 was celebrated in East 
Timor as the "Day of Revolution” . A huge rally 
of over 20,000 in the capital, Dili, concluded 
the celebrations.
On May 20 this year, the Day of Revolution 
was celebrated throughout East Timor, arms 
in hand, ina fe rociousguerrillaw araga instthe  
Indonesian invaders, a war that w ill continue 
until the invaders are finally forced to 
withdraw.
In a short two years, Fretilin has becomethe 
uncontested leader of the East Timorese 
people. It has m ob ilised  the 650,000 
population into a people’s army, able to hold at 
bay over 40,000 Indonesian troops, including 
about half their crack units, containing them to 
a dozen towns and villages, posing huge 
problems of supply, and putting paid to any 
hope the Jakarta generals had of ending this 
war with a quick decisive victory.
Slowly but surely, the centres of imperialist 
power are beginning to realise that East Timor 
is following the same road as Vietnam, 
Mozambique, Angola and Guinea-Bissau: a 
guerrilla war of a whoie people determined to 
fight to the death against the aggressors.
Denis Freney is member of the National Committee, 
CPA and an a c tiv is t in the C am pa ign fo r 
Independent East Timor.
The British-based intelligence gathering 
centre, the Institute of Strategic Studies, last 
week warned that Indonesia would face a long 
guerrilla war. The question is not if the 
Indonesian generals w ill be forced to withdraw 
their troops, but when and in what conditions.
Fretilin has won its unique position in such a 
sho rt period  of tim e  because o f the 
fundamental correctness of its policies and 
tactics. It had its origins among radical 
students and members of the elite who directly 
or indirectly made contact with Frelimo in the 
early 'sevenues in LiS D on. Avidly devouring 
the experiences of Frelimo, PAIGC and MPLA, 
reading the writings of their leaders, from 1970 
they began to prepare a cadre force which 
could be the basis for a future liberation 
movement. When Portuguese fascism was 
overthrown on April 25, 1974, there was 
already a nucleus of cadres both in East Timor 
and studying in Lisbon ready to launch such a 
m o ve m e n t. T ie s  w ith  F re lim o  w ere  
strengthened and its experience closely 
studied.
In the months that followed, Fretilin 
launched its anti-illiteracy campaign, its 
People’s Health Centres, and its p ilot co­
opera tives. It com batted  the c u ltu ra l 
colonialism which had repressed Timorese 
culture and language. The response it 
received from the people was to all observers 
amazing. It took full advantage of the political
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freedoms available after April 25 to educate 
the whole population in anti-colonialism and 
the need to end exploitation in all its forms.
But Fretilin was also continually aware of the 
over-riding danger of Indonesian invasion. By 
October 1974, the danger was already very 
real. In January 1975, Fretilin formed a 
coalition with the reactionary UDT - the 
representative of local vested interest. Some 
left sects have found this tactic adopted by 
Fretilin as evidence of “ betrayal” . But anyone 
who spoke to Fretilin leaders then knew very 
well that it was a tactic aimed at first isolating 
the pro-Indonesian forces, and second, at 
providing a climate in which they could extend 
their base, w ithout the active hostility of the 
UDT elite who were still influential in some 
areas. This tactic proved so successful that it 
was eventually the UDT, horrified by Fretilin ’s 
rapid growth into the dominant partner in the 
coalition, and encouraged by the anti­
communist wave in Portugal, which broke the 
coalition in March 1975 and embarked on 
preparations for its abortive coup of August 
1975.
Fretilin won its mass support through its 
direct concern and work with the people. In 
small ways, they showed in practice what 
independence and liberation would mean. 
After the failure of the UDT coup, Fretilin was 
able to show the masses, in three invaluable 
m onths, w ha t independence m eant. If 
h istorical parallels are in order, then it could be 
compared with the precious months the Viet 
Minh ruled Vietnam immediately after World 
War II, before the French invasion.
After five months of full-scale invasion, 
which followed three months of a border 
incursion, the Indonesian generals face rising 
discontent in the army, thousands of destitute 
soldiers’ widows and families in Java, a high 
cost of waging such a war (an estimated $2 
million a month) at a time when the country is 
bankrupt, and with the perspective of a war 
lasting years with a high level of guerrilla 
action.
The further the Indonesians push into the 
mountains, launching major attacks along 
treacherous roads with tanks and heavy 
artillery, to take a market village, the more they 
find their troops isolated, d ifficu lt to supply, 
and surrounded by hostile guerrillas, ready to 
knock out any group of troops heading off the
roads, into the mountains where the vast 
majority of the population live.
The magnitude of the m ilitary disaster 
threatening the Indonesians can be seen in a 
brief survey of this war. In mid-September, 
10,000 crack Indonesian troops, including the 
infamous Red Berets, began an attack along 
the border. Their plan was to sweep along the 
north coast and in from the centre-west to 
seize the capital Dili. After three months they 
had taken only four small villages on the 
northern coast, only one of which was more 
than 10 kilometres from the border.
The border war has been graphically 
described in articles sent by Australian 
journalist Roger East, part of which w ill be 
reprinted in the next issue of ALR.
On November 28, after a seaborne attack on 
the village of Atabae, Fretilin declared the 
Democratic Republic of East Timor, when it 
became clear that the Indonesian generals 
were determined on a full-scale invasion. The 
invasion began on December 7, when 15,000 
crack troops made an airborne and marine 
attack on Dili, and later on the second main 
town of Baucau. Again, the plan was rapid 
seizure of the two towns, and a coastal link-up. 
But instead, the Indones ians found  
themselves hemmed into the downtown city 
area of Dili, while their troops failed to take 
Baucau, only three kilometres inland, or the 
key international airport eight kilometres from 
the town. It was necessary fo r the Indonesians 
to bring in a further 10,000 troops to break the 
grip Fretilin forces had around Dili, and to take 
Baucau and its airport, after the second 
offensive on December 25. They took the 
inland town of Aileu, but again found they 
could go no further.
The Indonesians sent a further 10,000 troops 
into East Timor to launch an offensive in early 
February in a desperate attempt to seize the 
airstrip and ports in Fretilin hands. In March 
and April, the total number of Indonesian 
troops was brought to over 40,000 in an effort 
to make a final offensive in m id-April to 
capture a few more key towns.
All these offensives resulted in the capture 
of a few more towns and villages, on the main 
roads. But it remains a fact that over 70 per 
cent of the country still remains firm ly in East 
Timorese hands. Fretilin has adopted the 
classical guerrilla tactic of no longer fighting 
pos itiona l w arfare  (as it d id  between 
December 7 and 25) but of guerrilla attacks,
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and on a substantial scale. Besides the small- 
scale attacks that make it impossible, for 
instance, for a vehicle to go from Dili to the 
c ity ’s airport ten kilometres away w ithout a 
m ilita ry  escort, F re tilin  fo rces  m ount 
substantial attacks on Indonesian garrisons or 
units of less than a hundred men, with great 
success both in casualties inflicted and in 
weapons captured. The Indonesians, are thus 
finding great d ifficu lty in garrisoning the main 
roads, making transport of supplies inland 
very difficult, w ithout mounting a major 
military operation to get the supply trucks 
through. They have to rely on helicopters to do 
the job.
As a result, according to latest Fretilin 
reports, Indonesian troops are running short 
of food, even starving, and are driven to leave 
the sanctuary of the towns on the main roads, 
to hunt for food in thesurrounding mountains, 
where they present easy targets for the waiting 
guerrillas. Morale is therefore very low, which 
with the high casualty rate (around 800 killed a 
month) has forced the Jakarta generals to 
begin replacing crack Javanese troops with ill- 
trained troops from other islands.
But perhaps the m ostsignificantd isasterfor 
the Indonesians has been their total failure to 
build a puppet army which they can use to do 
the fighting. It has been axiomatic among 
imperialist theorists on guerrilla war that such 
a war cannot be won m ilitarily, but must be 
won politically, by building a substantial neo­
colonial force with some real base in the 
population. “ Divide and rule" is an old colonial 
axiom that has been applied with great 
success in guerrilla wars.
The Indonesians have tota lly neglected this 
aspect of any guerrilla war. When they invaded 
Dili on December 7, they blindly slaughtered 
all Timorese they found. When the UDT and 
APODETI Drisoners that had been left behind 
by Fretilin came forward to welcome their 
Indonesian “ liberators” they were machine- 
gunned down. The “ n e u tra l'' Chinese 
population of Dili was similarly slaughtered, 
their shops pillaged. (With one exception: the 
wealthiest Chinese businessman in East Timor 
was able to offer the Indonesian commander a 
sufficiently high bribe in time to stop the 
sacking of his shop.)
The Indonesians treated the reactionary 
UDT and APODETI leaders with contempt, 
offering them not even marginal power, and no
great privileges. Money is short in Jakarta 
these days, and East T imor is seen as a source 
of plunder, rather than a place where bribes 
can be lavished on the local elite.
As a result, the Indonesians have been 
forced to disarm their few hundred puppet 
troops because they could not trust them. And 
they can rely only on the puppet “ Governor” 
Arnaldo Araujo, with the remainder of the 
puppet government as unwilling prisoners, 
because their families are held as hostages.
The Indonesians have responded to the 
heroic resistance of the East Timorese by 
establishing concentration camps, and by 
systematic plunder of the country. That has 
not won them any "hearts and minds". Brutal 
intim idation does not woek when there is a 
well-organised guerrilla operating close by 
and inflicting heavy casualties on the enemy - 
on the contrary, it only strengthens resistance.
The Indonesian army is not the American 
army in Vietnam. It lacks the massive 
resources poured by Washington into that 
war. The Indonesians have military resources 
vastly superior to Fretilin, but in comparison 
w ith  the A m ericans in V ietnam , these 
resources are pitiful. If Fretilin had a sufficient 
quantity of heavy artillery, it could destroy the 
Indonesian forces relatively quickly. Instead, it 
has only the large supply of NATO-standard 
light weaponry left by the Portuguese when 
they fled in August.
In classic guerrilla style, they are now 
co nce n tra ting  on cap tu ring  weapons, 
in c lu d in g  heavy a r t i l le r y ,  fro m  th e  
Indonesians.
The generals are aware of their weaknesses. 
They have attempted to make the war they are 
waging not only a “secret war” to the outside 
world, but also within their own country. It is 
significant that there has been very little 
attempt to whip up chauvinist patriotism, to 
glorify the soldiers dying there or to win 
popular support. Instead, the dead have been 
buried secretly, w ithout m ilitary honors, the 
wounded are refused visits from their families, 
and no Indonesian journalists are permanently 
stationed in East Timor. The only news quoted 
is from the official news agency, Antara, or 
from ministerial sources.
The generals’ attempt to hide the reality of 
the East Timor war however is failing. There 
are too many destitute families, too many 
wounded in the hospitals and too many new
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troops leaving for the front for the press 
blackout to be effective.
The war coincides with an enormous 
economic and financial crisis for Indonesia, 
which concludes ten years of incredible 
corruption, venality and mismanagement 
among the generals who seized power in 1965. 
Moreover, a disastrous rice harvest means that 
in the coming months, the country will have to 
import 2 million tons of rice to avoid famine. 
Any further rise in the price of rice could spark 
o f f  m ass d is c o n te n t r iv a l l in g  th e  
demonstrations in January 1974.
Moreover, the Jakarta generals face rising 
discontent among the national minorities in 
widely scattered parts of the country. In West 
Irian, in an indicative clash, an Indonesian 
offensive in early January failed to crush the 
poorly armed guerrillas in the impenetrable 
hideouts. Elsewhere, the large-scale m ilitary 
involvement in East Timor must present a 
tempting perspective for uprisings or guerrilla 
warfare to other separatist movements that 
have long laid dormant. It is not always true 
that these movements, or their leaders, have 
the genuine interests of their people in mind. 
Many such movements have been subsidised 
by reactionary forces at a relatively low level 
over many years, as an insurance against any 
future revolutionary or anti-imperialist regime 
coming to power in Indonesia itself. But any 
new upsurge of guerrilla activity, requiring the 
use of substantial forces to combat it, would be 
the last straw for the Indonesian army.
Only a massive infusion of American m ilitary 
and financial aid could give the generals hope 
of continuing a long, expensive war in East 
Timor. American aid is definitely flowing in, 
specifically for the war. But it is aid which is 
undercover, probably through the CIA, to 
finance the war at best at its present level. 
Massive aid, which would be needed to step up 
the war, w ou ld  have to go th ro ug h  
congressional channels and become open. 
That may happen, but would be another stage 
in the war itself, and the worldwide reaction to 
it. But even such a massive infusion of aid, plus 
advisers, would be too late to crush a guerrilla 
war which is just getting into full swing.
Finally, there is the isolation of Indonesia on 
the world stage. In the Third World, as will be 
seen this month at the preparatory meeting of 
the Non-Aligned Heads of States Conference 
in Colombo in August, Indonesia will face
strong censure from that conference, and even 
condemnation in strongest terms from African 
nations. But it is in the Arab and Islamic world 
that Indonesia has suffered its most keenly felt 
rebuff. The largest Indonesian Embassy 
overseas is in Algeria, yet Algeria has emerged 
as one of Fretilin’s strongest supporters.
Fretilin has received strong support also 
from both Soviet and Chinese governments, 
from Vietnam and Cuba, and from all 
governments that claim to be progressive.
Suharto has always relied on stability at 
home and a low-key image abroad, avoiding 
too openly a pro-imperialist stance or giving 
cause for outrage overseas. All that has 
changed: the regime at home is shaken by a 
dual crisis, economically and militarily, while 
abroad it is now subject to strong attack from 
powerful or influential nations.
Could East Timor expect to receive the same 
help that other liberation movements have, 
from the socialist countries? Although it has 
sufficient light weapons fo r a lengthy guerrilla 
war, and can count on capturing enough to 
replace what they lose or use, a relatively small 
supply of heavy artillery, ground-to-air 
m issiles and a n ti-tank  w eapons could  
d ra m a tic a lly  s h o r te n  th e  w ar. The 
geographical and logistic d ifficulties of such 
supplies reaching Fretilin are great. But it is 
undoubtedly a constant nightmare for the 
generals that such supplies will eventually 
reach the liberation forces and bring a mafor 
power directly or indirectly into the conflict. 
While that does not seem likely at present, the 
continuing resistance of Fretilin and the decay 
becoming increasingly evident in Jakarta, 
along with a rapidly growing worldwide 
movement of solicarity and the isolation of 
Suharto, could conceivably make such aid 
reaching Fretilin more likely in the future.
Indonesia is a tinder-box in which the ruling 
clique faces increasingly d ifficu lt problems, 
which must tempt rival generals and liberation 
movements throughout the area.
May 20, 1977 will present a vastly different 
picture not only in East Timor, but throughout 
the whole of Indonesia. The East Timor crisis 
will by then be no longer a major issue only in 
Australia and Indonesia itself, but one of 
worldwide dimensions.
For the imperialists and their friends learn 
nothing from history.
